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DEFENSE AGAINST BIOMETRIC REPRODUCTION ATTACKS
ABSTRACT
Systems and methods for defense against biometric reproduction attack are disclosed.
The system includes one or more mobile devices installed with a security feature integrated to
the operating system or installed to the device as an app. The security feature is in
communication with a server installed with a mobile device management solution. The device
includes a multi-factor authentication system including at least one biometric authenticator and
at least one non-biometric authenticator. The method includes prompting for biometric
authentication, if the network is reachable. In the absence of an active network, the server may
instruct the device to stop using a biometric authentication and request the user for a
multifactor authentication. The systems and methods provide for full enterprise connectivity on
devices with a biometric authentication system. The present disclosure allows the network
administrators to address biometric reproduction attacks with variable levels of risk tolerance.
BACKGROUND
Biometric authentication factors (e.g. fingerprint authentication) are becoming
increasingly commonplace for use in systems such as mobile devices including phones and
tablets, computers, and various government resources. However, biometrics may be fooled
through a reproduction attack where the attacker creates a replica of the biometric
authenticator. For instance, a conductive ink or a thin film may be used to reproduce a
fingerprint. The requisite information may be lifted from a device itself, from some other
object or system that stores a representation of a fingerprint, or reproduced from a photo.
As revocation of the biometric authenticator in the system is not possible, the mitigation
against reproduction attacks requires an administrator to disable using a biometric authenticator
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on a device that may no longer be in the possession of the rightful owner. To do that, the
device must be reachable across the network, unless it can make its own decisions that
biometric authentication should be prevented. Once an attacker is in possession of the device
that accepts a biometric authenticator, it becomes a race against time to disable use of
biometric authentication on the device

before the attacker manages to reproduce the

authenticator. For instance, mobile phones that accept fingerprint authentication require the
user to enter a PIN code or password if the device has been out of use for 24 to 48 h. However,
24 to 48 h is more than enough time than is needed for a skilled attacker to reproduce a
biometric authenticator. Additionally, network administrators may be able to disable a device
remotely when the loss is reported by the user. However, this relies on an active network
connection. Currently, it remains possible for an attacker to easily defeat such protection
measures by placing the device in airplane mode, or to block network connectivity by going
into a shielded facility.
DESCRIPTION
Systems and methods for defense against biometric reproduction attack are disclosed.
The system is depicted in FIG. 1 and includes one or more mobile devices installed with a
security feature enabled for mobile device management. The security feature may be integrated
to the operating system or installed to the device as an app. The device is in communication
with a server installed with a mobile device management solution. The device has a multifactor authentication system including at least one biometric authenticator and at least one nonbiometric authenticator. In one example, the biometric authenticator may be a fingerprint, iris
or facial recognition authenticator. The non-biometric authenticator may include somethingyou-know authenticator, or a something-you-have authenticator. The something-you-know
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authenticator may be a PIN, password or pattern. The server is under the control of a network
administrator that may issue commands to the security application remotely.

FIG. 1: A system for defense against biometric reproduction attacks
The method of mounting a defense against a biometric reproduction attack is depicted in
FIG. 2. The device prompts for a biometric authentication if the network is reachable. In the
absence of an active network, the device prompts the user for a non-biometric authentication,
such as a something-you-know or something-you-have authentication, to unlock the device. The
device may request for a multi-factor authentication if the user attempts to disable the network
stack in the device. The security feature can disable access to the device or delete files in the
device based on predefined criteria that detects or defines an intruder attack. The device may
continue to accept biometric authentication under certain circumstances, such as for a specific
time after network connectivity is lost, or if the network connectivity was manually disabled
after presenting a something-you-know/have authenticator, or if the device is expected to be on a
plane at this time.
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In one instance, the security application requests a non-biometric authenticator to be
entered every time the device is unlocked when the network is unreachable. Alternatively, a
non-biometric authenticator is required the first time the device is unlocked within a specific
timeline, but biometric authentication is then enabled for a period of time much shorter than 2448 hours. In another instance, a non-biometric authenticator is required only the first time the
device is unlocked after the network is unreachable, but biometric authentication is then reenabled until the network is once again reachable. In some instances, certain features, such as
access to certain apps and data are made unavailable by the security application unless a
something-you-know/have authenticator is used to re-enable these features. In instances where
maximizing the usability is desired while maintaining a slightly improved security posture, the
biometric authentication system may remain enabled if the network stack was disabled
immediately after authentication with a non-biometric authenticator.
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FIG. 2: A method for defense against biometric reproduction attacks
The systems and methods address an unsolved problem of biometric reproduction attacks
on devices. The only related solution that is available till now is the requirement for somethingyou-know authentication after an idle period. The systems and methods provide for full
enterprise connectivity on devices with biometric authentication system. The present disclosure
allows the network administrators to address biometric reproduction attacks with variable levels
of risk tolerance.
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